# Game Theory with Economic and Finance **Applications**

Magistère BFA 2 - Fall 2024

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Introduction

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
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# Regulation in Fisheries




# Introduction Outline

- Introduction


2/44

# Regulation in Fisheries



3/44

### Regulation in Fisheries



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# Regulation in Fisheries

#### Solution

Thought #2: If they have too big of boats, we should limit vessel size

#### Problem

Response #2: Fishermen cut off the prow of their boats and loaded it with lots of crew



### Regulation in Fisheries

#### Solution

Thought #1: If we have too many fishermen, we need to limit the number of boats that can fish

#### Problem

Response #1: The remaining fishermen in the industry built bigger boats to catch the "extra" fish



# Regulation in Fisheries

#### Solution

Thought #3: If they have too many crew members, we should limit the crew size

#### Problem

Response #3: Fishermen loaded up their boats with tons of fishing gear



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### Regulation in Fisheries

#### Solution

Thought #4: This is getting ridiculous, we'll just close the season once a quota of fish have been caught

#### Problem

Response #4: Fishermen set out the first day of the season and catch and catch and catch... and seasons which used to end in 180 days ended in 2 days.



# Regulation in Fisheries

### Question

Why did all these regulatory measures fail?

### Solution

Because they ignore the strategic interaction so they just failed to account for the fundamental incentives driving fisherman behavior.

# Regulation in Fisheries


### Solution


Thought #5: Well, we'll just set days on which they can fish

#### Problem

Response #5: Fishermen buy enormous motors to "race for fish" creating a very dangerous "Fish Derby!"







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
Introduction

13 / 44

# Game theory applications Finance



# Game theory applications Economics



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
Introduction

14 / 44

# Game theory applications International relations



# Game theory applications Political science




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Introduction

17 / 44

# Game theory applications Law




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Introduction

18 / 44

# Game theory applications Biology



# Game theory applications Biology



# Game theory applications Artificial intelligence



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
Game Theory

Introduction

ո 2

#### 21 / 44

# Game theory applications Artificial intelligence




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22 / 44

# Game theory applications Artificial intelligence



# Game theory: predictive tool?

Set of tools that leads to predictions on behavior of players

Are the predictions generally correct?

We will often examine lab evidence

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# Beauty contest Rules of the game

- 1 All take a piece of paper, write your name
- 2 Write a number between 0 and 100
- 3 The student whose number is the closest to half the average is the winner
- 4 If tie between several students, random draw
- 5 Cannot discuss with others or look at their piece of paper....

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25 / 44

# Beauty contest Interesting questions

- Are players rational?
- What does "rationality" imply in this game?
- How should a rational player behave in a population in which not everyone is perfectly rational?

## Beauty contest Results

- Result of the first round:
  - Average:
  - ► Half the average:
  - Winner:
- Result of the second round:
  - Average:
  - ► Half the average:
  - Winner:
- Result of the third round:
  - Average:
  - ► Half the average:
  - Winner:

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26 / 44

# Beauty contest Pictures



# Beauty contest Pictures



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29 / 44

# Beauty contest

Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis



Rain dance: not a self-fulfilling prophecy

### Beauty contest

Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis

A **self-fulfilling prophecy** is a prediction that causes itself to become true, by the very terms of the prophecy itself, due to positive feedback between belief and behavior.









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30 / 44

# Beauty contest


Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis



"I THOUGHT WE WERE JUST BUYING A HOUSE!"

### Beauty contest

### Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis



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Introduction 3

33 / 44


# **Beauty contest**

Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis

- European sovereign-debt crisis:
  - ► The debt levels of European countries kept rising since 2007, mostly due to the large bailout packages provided to the financial sector during the late-2000s financial crisis.
  - However, high debt levels alone may not explain the crisis.
  - ► The budget deficit for the euro area as a whole is much lower and the euro area's government debt/GDP ratio of 86% in 2010 was about the same level as that of the US.

# Beauty contest

## Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis



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
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Introduction

34 / 44

# Beauty contest

### Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis



Eurostat estimates from November 2013

Fiscal balance = tax revenue (and the proceeds of assets sold) - government spending.

When the balance is positive (resp. negative), the government has a fiscal surplus (resp. deficit).

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### Beauty contest

Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis

- Banks had substantial holdings of bonds from economies such as Greece which offered a small premium and seemingly were equally sound.
- As the crisis developed it became obvious that Greek, and possibly other countries', bonds offered substantially more risk.
- The loss of confidence is marked by rising sovereign CDS prices, indicating market expectations about countries' creditworthiness.
- Next figure: Sovereign CDS prices of selected European countries (2010-2011).
  - ▶ The left axis is in basis points. E.g., a level of 1,000 means it costs \$1 million to protect \$10 million of debt for five years.

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Introduction

37 / 44


## Beauty contest

Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis

- Beginning in early 2010, renewed anxiety about excessive national debt of investors demanded ever higher interest rates from several government with higher debt levels, deficits and current account deficits.
- This in turn made it difficult for some governments to finance further budget deficits and service existing debt, particularly when economic growth rates were low, as in the case of Greece and Portugal.
- The loss of confidence and the consequent government behaviors can be explained by the self-fulfilling mechanism.

## Beauty contest

Market self-fulfilling prophecy: European sovereign-debt crisis



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38 / 44

## Introduction Outline

- Outline of the course

39 / 44

# Describing games

In general, a game is defined by:

- Set of players
- 2 Set of choices for these players
- 3 Payoff function depending on choices

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# Outline of the course

- 1 Introduction and Chapter 1: Simultaneous games  $(c_1 \& \frac{c_2}{2})$
- 2 Chapter 2: Sequential games  $(\frac{c_2}{2} \& c_3)$
- 3 Chapter 3: Repeated games  $(c_4 \& \frac{c_5}{2})$
- 4 Chapter 4: Incomplete information games  $(\frac{c_5}{2}\&c_6)$

# Major differences between games

Certain dimensions will help us categorize and study games:

- Timing of the game:
  - ▶ Do the players play at the same time (*simultaneous games*)?
  - ► Or do they observe other players moves and then decide (*sequential games*)?
- 2 Is the game played once or is it repeated several times?
- 3 Do all the players have the same information?
  - ► Can imagine that players have better information about some payoff of the game.

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12 / 14

### **Contact and Evaluation**

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Course assessment: final exam

43 / 44